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Introduction. 
I D E A L I S M , 
The thought that unity runs through a l l experience. 
The doctrine of Idealism i s usually thought of as beginning with 
Plato, " The term ideas was older than Plato; but i t s applica-
t i o n to heavenly types, i t s metaphysical employment, and i t s 
substitution for Pythagorean numbers, were almost cer t a i n l y 
Platonic i n v e n t i o n s ( E n c y p . Q 
Plato taught that God and matter existed, and that out of 
matter, which had neither form nor organism, God made the world* 
But he fashioned i t into, or l i k e , the 1 1 Eternal forms", which 
were not only the patterns, but the essence of things• These 
"Eternal forms nwere called ideas• Thus i n the divine mind there 
existed,ideas, or forms, long before the worlds were made** 
This sense of the word i s used i n philosophy and l i t e r a t u r e down 
to the 17th century. Milton expresses i t i n these l i n e s , 1 God saw 
his works were good answering his f a i r idea' 1 1. (Oyp.) As i t i s 
with abstract q u a l i t i e s , so i t i s with individual things, f(name) 
A horse, a dog, a person, i s perfect only as he approaches 
these ideal forms that exist outside of each i n d i v i d u a l . These 
i d e a l forms are alone r e a l ; a l l else i s temporal and passing* 
t 
S i r Wm. Hamilton says that t h i s idea was f i r s t changed by 
David Buchanan i n 1636, one year e a r l i e r than Descartes. These 
men made the word, idea, mean thoughts about matter and not the 
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t 
eternal forms* .Letbrtits and Lock supported thfe- two just named, 
and desired the word to stand f o r t! whatever. I D the object of 
the understanding when a man thinks 1* (Encyl#) 
While Spinoza held to the Pantheistic view, we must s t i l l 
regard him aa a d i s c i p l e of Idealism* 
11 Everything swallowed up i n God* God i s a l l , and a l l i s 
God,—not interchangeably, for that would bo m a t e r i a l i s t i c 
Theism, which i s p r a c t i c a l l y Atheism; n but with the precedence 
and exclmsiveness of the divine, and that i s i d e a l i s t i c 
•Pantheism,." (Gyp*) 
The philosopher who t r i e d to turn the keen edge of 
Spinoza 1s reasoning away from C h r i s t i a n i t y , and who might be 
said to be the f i r s t representative of modern Idealism was Bishop 
Berkeley* He maintained that*" the q u a l i t i e s of supposed objects 
cannot be perceived d i s t i n c t from the mind that perceives them; 
and these q u a l i t i e s , i t w i l l be allowed, are a l l that we can know 
of such objects* 
I f , therefore,there were external bodies* i t i s impos-
s i b l e we should ever know i t ; and i f there were not, we should 
have exactly the same reason f o r believing there were «s we now 
have; a l l , therefore* which r e a l l y exists i s s p i r i t , or the 1 
• * t • 
thinking p r i n c i p l e 1 — o u r s e l v e s , our fellow-men and God* What we 
c a l l ideas are presented to us by God i n a certain order of 
succession* which order of successive presentation i s what we 
mean by the laws of nature* n 
Hume followed Berkeley and taking advantage of the 
li b e r t y suggested i n the quotation repudiated a l l certain 
knowledge.11 He not only denied the re a l i t y of the thing percei 1 
ed, hut of the mind perceiving". The German philosophers,Kant, 
Fichte, and Schelling used the word idea again i n the 
Platonic sense. About this period i n philosophic history, 
Idealism met the new thought of Empiricism. Descartes had 
brought forward his doctrine of" inate ideas 1 1. Lock was 
greatly exercised over this and wrote with the especial 
purpose of refuting these " inate ideas" of Descartes. The 
German idealism seemed something of a compromise* Inate ideas 
were merely methods or channels of grasping Universal truths. 
Kant taught" The world of our knowledge i s a world which goes 
back for i t s explanation to the unity of the s e l f , or of 
consciousness. This self, however, i s not barely an individual 
i t i s universal i n i t s nature, and so knowledge h&s a rational 
v a l i d i t y and significance." (425 Rogers II. of P.) Hegel 
so modified the word ideas, that his doctrine might well be 
called absolute Idealism. 
With this hasty sketch of idealism we come up to modem 
thought and the more completely worked out philosophy of Royce 
and his conception of ideas. 
We have referred to the two meanings of the word idea, 
as used i n the different individual philosophies of the 
past. Prof. Royce adopts the Platonic idea rather than the 
Descartan; he says, " What existed before there was any 
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conscious l i f e on t h i s Planet? 1 1 In what sense was there l i g h t 
or heat, matter or motion, before there were eyes to see* 
t a c t i l e organs to f e e l , animal i n t e l l i g e n c e to understand these 
V 
e x t e r n a l ' f a c t s ? " Before there were conscious beings on t h i s 
plo.net, t h i s planet existed only i n and f o r the u n i v e r s a l con-
sciousness* In that consciousness were fac t s corresponding to 
a l l the phenomena, or p o s s i b i l i t i e s of experience, that geolog-
i c a l science may declare to have r e a l l y existed at such a time* 
When the earth became f i l l e d with l i f e , there appeared i n the 
u n i v e r s a l consciousness the data known as organisms, and at the 
same time* beside the unive r s a l consciousness, somehow r e l a t e d 
to i t , there arose i n d i v i d u a l conscious beings, whose states were 
more or l e s s imperfect copies of the uni v e r s a l consciousness i n 
c e r t a i n of i t s f a c t s * * (Asp* 351) 
We cannot see i n the above clear cut^eternal forms" of 
P l a t o which existed i n the consciousness of the Absolute before 
organized l i f e appeared upon the planet, but there existed i n the 
consciousness of the eternal ideas s i m i l a r to what oxisted upon 
the early g e o l o g i c a l periods of the earth* 
Prom the expression," When the earth became f i l l e d with 
l i f e , there appeared i n the universal consciousness the data known 
as organism," i t appears that l i f e organism preceded the "eternal 
forms". However, p r i o r i t y i s not the main point with Hoyce. But 
that the idea holds a very important place i n matters p e r t a i n i n g 
to R e a l i t y * 
A f t e r quoting many d i f f e r e n t writers on Idealism, 
5. 
our author says, that they a l l agree on the one "point, v i z : 
tf that thought, where, i t i n q u i r e s i n t o i t s own meaning, 
can never r e s t s a t i s f i e d w ith any idea of e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y 
that makes such r e a l i t y other than a datum of consciousness, 
and so m a t e r i a l f o r thought. , f 
rr Sensualism and the most transcendent a p r i o r i spec-
u l a t i o n agree i n coming at l a s t to f l e e i n ceaseless unrest 
every support f o r an e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y that may. seem to o f f e r 
i t s e l f beyond the bounds of consciousness. This phenomenism 
of po.st-Kantian s p e c u l a t i o n , i s at a l l events, the si m p l e s t 
and l e a s t c o n t r a d i c t o r y p o s t u l a t e . *t (Asp. 363.) 
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P R E L I M I N A R Y . 
The object of t h i s Thesis i s to trace the philosophy 
of Prof. J o s i a h Royce as i t has appeared to' develop from i t s 
i n c i p i e n c y i n ff R e l i g i o u s Aspects'Of Philosophy" to i t s com-
p l e t i o n i n w Conception of God" • We do not deem i t presumf)-
t i o n to say there has been a development f o r the w r i t t e n 
page has not f a i l e d to speak the same t h i n g to others. 
The f o l l o w i n g t o p i c s , when t r e a t e d by the younger Royce 
appear to the,reader i n a very d i f f e r e n t l i g h t when t r e a t e d 
by the elde r and more mature Royce. 
The f i r s t contrast to be noted i s the s p i r i t e x h i b i t e d 
i n the e a r l i e r work and the one manifested i n the l a s t 
book. 
In the f i r s t , I t i s impetuous and shows an impatience 
and la c k of due tolerance f o r the opinions of men who may 
d i f f e r from him. 
As an example of t h i s , we c a l l a t t e n t i o n to h i s r e f e r -
ences to what he c a l l s T T r a d i t i o n a l Theology". He a s s e r t s 
that he belongs to no r e l i g i o u s o r g a n i z a t i o n and has no s o r t 
of a desire foe such connection. 1 (Asp*6) 
R e f e r r i n g to the present r e l i g i o u s a g i t a t i o n he says^ 
* How may mankind l i v e the harmonious emotional l i f e , when 
men are d r i v e n f o r t h e i r i d e a l s back upon themselves, when 
t r a d i t i o n a l f a i t h i s removed, when the age i s f u l l of wretch-
edness and of. b l i n d s t r i v i n g . " (Asp. 117) Again,"We know not 
yet what form our coming f a i t h w i l l take". 
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I t i s q u i t e evident t h a t he assumed t h a t present R e l i g i o u s 
forms of f a i t h were p r a c t i c a l l y dead. 
In r e j e c t i n g m i r a c l e s he terms b e l i e f i n them 
" T r a d i t i o n a l S u p e r s t i t i o n " , (Asp. 481.) 
In r e f e r r i n g to one of h i s own thoughts he assert3 
tf I f t h i s i s philosophy T r a d i t i o n a l Theism can do what I t 
pleases about the matter". ( Asp. 417.) 
This c h i p on the shoulder s p i r i t i s f u r t h e r shown by 
h i s language when r e f e r r i n g to p h i l o s o p h e r s of note. He says 
of Spencer," We r e j e c t w h olly the n o t i o n t h a t Mr. Spencer 
or any l i k e teacher has ever caught a glimpse of the f u n -
d i m e n t a l e t h i c a l problem. Spencer seems to be i n the most 
c h i l d l i k e ignorance t h a t there i s any such problem at a l l . " 
(Asp. 177.) 
That t h i s s p i r i t was a p a r t of h i s nature i s evidenced 
by h i s language when r e f e r r i n g to h i m s e l f . I t seems t h a t at 
one time he h e l d t h a t there was l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e between 
t r u t h and e r r o r — m e r e l y a v e r b a l one. 
In r e f e r r i n g to t h i s he terms i t " p l a u s i b l e j a r g o n " 
and meaningless d o c t r i n e " . 
V/e f i n d that t h i s s p i r i t Is c a r r i e d , i n a g r e a t 
measure, through the e n t i r e book" Aspects of P h i l o s o p h y " , but 
when we read h i s " Conception of God" we can but note a 
8. 
decided change;from the s p i r i t that the world has waited 
long f o r me to the s p i r i t of seeking to agree w i t h b r o t h e r 
p h i l o s o p h e r : to a r e a l oneness with T r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f s , 
which b e l i e f s seem to have grown i n harmony - with h i s own 
pjiilo^ophy. 
Prom t h i s d i s c u s s i o n - o f the S p i r i t of our philosopher 
we t u r n to h i s p h i l o s o p h i e s . 
At t h i s place i n the examination, i t would be w e l l to 
mention the d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s showing the change, and then 
leave the f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n of each to i t s proper place 
i n the paper. 
Upon the question of the Absolute or God, our author 
f i r s t took a strong P a n t h e i s t i c view; he even declared i t 
not to be Theism, and war&<3d h i s readers, that i f he d i d say 
God at times, they must not t h i n k he r e f e r r e d to the being 
u s u a l l y meant by God. 
From t h i s p o s i t i o n he f i n a l l y reached pure Theism, 
which w i l l be shown i n i t s place. 
As a young man he s t r i k e s at a popular chord when 
he r e a l l y r e j e c t s * f u t u r e punishment", and says that J e s u s 
anathematized a l l who would not b e l i e v e i n him. As a mature 
philosopher he f i n d s that a l l persons must get the quest 
of t h e i r l i v e s , t h i s too, w i l l be n o t i c e d i n i t s place. His 
i d e a of t r u t h developed from the misty" h i g h e r thought" to 
h i s c l e a r ideas of purpose. 
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The freedom of the i n d i v i d u a l merged in t o h i s over-
shadowing Absolute, reaches the power to choose i t s own 
g o a l - l i f e or death. 
His e t e r n i t y of e v i l was an important doctrine during 
h i s younger years. In h i s l a t e r philosophy he sees h i s i n -
d i v i d u a l e a s i l y win out and overcome. His i n d i v i d u a l i t y 
so blended and absorbed and last,developed i n t o the unique 
separate i n d i v i d u a l . From a t o t a l l y hopeless man our author 
tr a c e s h i s immortality doctrine up to the f u l l conception 
of a l i f e a f t e r death. 
Among the theories taken up and r e j e c t e d we mention 
Realism, A l t r u i s m and Egoism, E t h i c a l skepticism and e t h i c a l 
Pessimism; Monism, R e l i g i o n of Jesus, Pantheism and Theism. 
A f t e r having examined and re j e c t e d a l l of these ideas 
by means of Skepticism, he tmrns on i t and says, f f E t h i c a l 
s kepticism leads to the gloomiest pessimism". But ivhen used 
to f i n d t r u t h , i t i s of great value. Thus he cle a r e d the 
way f o r h i s own ideas. 
ETERNAL PUNISHMENT. 
I s h a l l now r e f e r to one of the r e j e c t e d moral i d e a l s , 
that of Jesus. Our author i s w i l l i n g to grant the excellence 
of Jesus' e t h i c a l teaching, but f i n d s that h i s p o s i t i o n i s 
not defensible against the skeptic. 
rf I f I f e e l not the love of God how prove to me that 
I ought to f e e l i t ? * , or, ff Why must I be l o v i n g and u n s e l f i s h " ? 
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Our author seems to t h i n k these questions unanswerable, f o r 
he says:" Now, the simple, p r a c t i c a l way of d e a l i n g w i t h 
a l l such objectors i s to anathematize them a't once," He 
that b e l i e v e t h not s h a l l be damned: bu,t anathemas are not 
arguments. To r e s o r t to them i s to give up t h e o r e t i c a l 
E t h i c s ; ff We who are c o n s i d e r i n g not whom we s h a l l p r a c t i -
c a l l y condemn, but what we can say i n f a v o r of any moral 
theory must be u n w i l l i n g to be put o f f w i t h mere o r a t o r i c a l 
p ersuasion, or to mistake p r a c t i c a l * adhesion f o r t h e o r e t i c a l 
c o n v i c t i o n . We want a code that s h a l l seem not only admirable, 
but, i f so i t may be, demonstrable." (Asp. 48-9) 
He f i n d s then that the moral ide a of Jesus i s blocked 
because the obj e c t o r asks why must I love God &c, and as he 
says i s anathematized by Jesus. But Royce i s to f i n d a moral 
i n s i g h t not so blocked but one that i s demonstrable. 
Now l e t us f o l l o w him and see i f the very s k e p t i c 
who so blocked the path of Jesus may not block him w i t h the 
same query. 
His " f i r s t p o s i t i v e d o c t r i n e he* terms h i s "Moral* r\ 
I n s i g h t " . .He. says, n So act as thou wouldst w i l l to act 
i f a l l the consequences of thy act f o r a l l the aims t h a t are 
everywhere to be a f f e c t e d by t h i s a c t , could be r e a l i z e d 
by thee now and i n t h i s one i n d i v i s i b l e , moment".(141 Asp.) 
Again: " L i f t up th i n e eyes, behold that l i f e . " (168 Asp) 
Once more: " Get and keep the moral i n s i g h t as an experience 
and do a l l that thou canst to extend among men t h i s experience 
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(172 Asp.) Mow comes Royce's own sk e p t i c and says:" Why 
must I l i f t up my eyes and see t h i s l i f e ? " "Why must I get 
and keep ahd c a r r y to others t h i s experience?" 
This i n s i g h t i s an a c t i o n of the w i l l and may he r e -
je c t e d hy any one. To these Royce says:" Remain b l i n d i f you 
w i l l : we have no means of preventing you." (170 Asp.) 
What i s the Junior Royce going to do with those who do r e -
j e c t t h i s I n s i g h t ? 
He says the simple^ p r a c t i c a l way that the c h r i s t i a n 
would deal w i t h them would be to anathamatize them. 
" But anathemas are not argument". And we are not 
allowed to use" o r a t o r i c a l persuasion", and by h i s own con-
c e s s i o n men may r e j e c t h i s I n s i g h t . But f o r the timely h e l p 
of the E l d e r Royce, Our Skeptic would have the same power of 
the J u n i o r that he had of the moral i d e a l s of Jesus. 
In conception of God, page 283 v/e read," In such 
cases, the goal of l i f e remains the i d e a l , but the i n d i v i d -
u a l i s an e v i l - d o e r , a r e l a t i v e l y l o s t s o u l . " And again, 
" To be sure, i f t h i s l i f e - i d e a l has i t s e s s e n t i a l l y anarch-
i c a l or d i a b o l i c a l aspect, t h i s i m p l i e s that t h i s ego may, 
as a moral being, reach the p e r f e c t i o n of i t s own k i n d i n 
the formr of a r e l a t i v e l y l o s t - o r morally bankrupt Ego: and 
I see no reason to deny that numerous i n d i v i d u a l s , f r e e l y 
a t t e n d i n g to the i d e a l which r a t i o n a l l y i n v o l v e s t h e i r own 
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damnation, a t t a i n , i n t h e i r s p e c i a l types of r e l a t i v e per-
f e c t i o n to t h e i r chosen goal." Now who are these numerous 
i n d i v i d u a l s who thus a t t a i n t h e i r goal as l o s t souls and 
are r a t i o n a l l y damned? The answer must be those who r e j e c t e d 
the Moral I n s i g h t . And what has the el d e r Royce f i n a l l y done 
with them? L e t I s not c a l l i t anathema, f o r that i s not a r -
gument. I t i s merely g e t t i n g out of l i f e what you sought. But 
a f t e r ' a l l , the elder Royce does just what he accuses Jesus of 
doing, v i z : allowing those who refuse the good to f r e e l y 
reap the r i g h t f u l harvest. I t i s remarkable how some things be 
come anathemas when u t t e r e d by c e r t a i n men, and good philosophy 
when u t t e r e d by* others. 
THE ABSOLUTE. 
On the question of God, Royce fs e a r l y philosophy d i f f e r e d 
very m a t e r i a l l y from that of h i s l a t e r years. His f i r s t thought 
was l a r g e l y P a n t h e i s t i c . But during the .developments of h i s , 
completed work, he becomes strongly T h e i s t i c . 
We. s h a l l show t h i s development by quoting f r e e l y from h i s 
e a r l i e s t work," R e l i g i o u s Aspects of Philosophy" and co n t r a s t 
t h i s with h i s l a t e r books. " Hence, the deepest a s s e r t i o n 
of i d e a l i s m i s not that above a l l the e v i l powers In the 
world, there i s at work some good power mightier than they, 
but r a t h e r that through a l l the powers, good and e v i l , and i n 
them a l l , dwells the higher s p i r i t that does not so much 
Create as c o n s t i t u t e them what they are, and so include them 
a l l " . (Asp. 335) 
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" And thus we have found Job's a l l knowing judge" . 
" He knoweth the way that I t a k e 1 . ff Here i s an absolute 
estimate, o b j e c t i v e l y present i n the world, ah estimate 
of a l l your good and e v i l deeds. f f ff You are a p a r t of the 
u n i v e r s a l l i f e " . Your thoughts are p a r t s of the whole. Your 
a c t s form an element i n the u n i v e r s e t h a t the good Judge 
knows", " and f o r him are a l l r e l a t i o n s , present, past and 
f u t u r e . " (Asp. 331)" We must see the d i v i n e everywhere." 
( 482 Asp.) 
" And when we turned to see, and behold, God was i n 
t h i s p l a c e , though we had known i t not." " The genuine God 
thai we thus found was -no incomplete s t r u g g l i n g God, whom we 
might p i t y i n h i s c o n f l i c t w i t h e v i l , but the a l l - e m b r a c i n g 
thought, i n which the t r u t h i s e t e r n a l l y f i n i s h e d " . ( 4 4 3 Asp.) 
"No power i t i s to be r e s i s t e d , no plan-maker t o be 
f o i l e d by f a l l e n angels, nothing f i n i t e , n o t h i n g s t r i v i n g , 
s e eking, l o s i n g , a l t e r i n g , growing weary; the A l l - E n f o l d e r 
i t i s , and we know i t s name." ( 435 Asp) 
" Thou hast never seen, or heard, or touched, or han-
d l e d , or loved anything but God". " Serve the whole God, not 
the i r r a t i o n a l l y separate p a r t that thy d e l u s i o n s have made 
thee support to be an independent t h i n g . " (Asp.442) 
Whether h i s d o c t r i n e i s Theism or Pantheism, the younger 
Royce i s a b s o l u t e l y i n d i f f e r e n t , i n f a c t , he a s s e r t s i t i s 
n e i t h e r . " I t d i f f e r s from the common t r a d i t i o n a l form of 
both. Both u s u a l l y c o nsider God as a Power, and e i t h e r l e a v e 
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him o f f on one side to push things o c c a s i o n a l l y , or to s e t 
them going at the outset, or else i d e n t i f y him w i t h h i s 
products." (477 Asp.) We take n e i t h e r of these ways". 
In another p l a c e , when r e f e r r i n g to Theism, he says, 
" There are w r i t e r s who have undertaken to defend theism, 
and who have a c t u a l l y , i n a l l s i n c e r i t y , argued f o r the nec-
e s s i t y of the U n i v e r s a l Thought." The p l a i n people have r e a -
son to suspect such of t r y i n g to s u b s t i t u t e f o r the 'God" 
of our Fathers' something e l s e " . (475 Asp) We answer very 
p l a i n l y that we d e s i r e to do nothing of the sort".CA 475) 
This i s one of the cases, e v i d e n t l y , where men do 
t h i n g s that they have no d e s i r e to do, f o r we know of no, 
man who holds more s t r o n g l y to the U n i v e r s a l Thought than 
does Royce. And he l a t e r becomes one of these very " w r i t e r s " , 
who undertake to defend Theism and h e l d " i n a l l s i n c e r i t y 
f o r the n e c e s s i t y of the U n i v e r s a l Thought. The man who 
c o u l d not defend Theism, and who was c a r e l e s s as to what 
you c a l l e d him, has reached a place i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l dev-
elopment when the f o l l o w i n g quotations taken from concep-
t i o n s of God expresses h i s modified views. (49,50, C of G. ) 
" I n b r i e f , then, the foregoing conception of God 
undertakes to be d i s t i n c t l y T h e i s t i c and not P a n t h e i s t i c " . 
" I t i s not a U n i v e r s a l Substance, i n whose law our 
e t h i c a l independence i s l o s t : " " Every e t h i c a l p r e d i c a t e 
that the highest r e l i g i o u s f a i t h of the past has a t t r i b u t e d 
to God i s capable of exact i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n terms of anr 
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present view," " Firr my own jbart, then, while I wish to be 
no slave of any t r a d i t i o n , I am c e r t a i n l y disposed to i n s i s t 
that what the f a i t h of our fat h e r s has genuinely meant by 
God, i s despite a l l the blindness and. a l l the u n e s s e n t i a l 
accidents to r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n , i d e n t i c a l w ith the inev-
i t a b l e outcome of a r e f l e c t i v e philosophy.* 
As a contrast we q u o t e : " This U n i v e r s a l thought i s 
what we have ventured f o r the sake of convenience, to c a l l 
God. I t i s not the God of very much of the t r a d i t i o n a l the-
ology. I t i s the God of the i d e a l i s t i c t r a d i t i o n from P l a t o 
downward." 
In h i s e a r l i e s t book he asserts what he, f o r conven-
ience, terms,"God* , i s not the God of very much of " t r a -
d i t i o n a l theology". In h i s l a t e r one he asse r t s that what the 
f a i t h of our*fathers has meant by God, i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h the 
God of r e f l e c t i v e philosophy. Thus we see i n +he f i r s t book 
he i s not » while i n the second he is_, but the p o s i t i v e has 
been reached by a se c o n d " r e f l e c t i v e " a c t . 
From these quotations We perceive that Royce was, at 
the beginning of h i s philosophic career, n e i t h e r P a n t h e i s t i c 
nor T h e i s t i c i n h i s own view. But h i s e a r l i e r w r i t i n g s , 
however, have impressed h i s readers as being s t r o n g l y 
P a n t h e i s t i c . Prof. Howison c l e a r l y reads Pantheism i n them, 
even a f t e r Prof. Royce had avowedly declared that h i s 
philosophy was Theism. But to us he seems to have g r a d u a l l y 
progressed from what was, i n f a c t , pure A B i a t i c Pantheism 
t o the h i s t o r i c Theism which.he i n h i s l a t e r works, f u l l y 
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embraced. It would seem that our author i s almost ready to 
concede i n his " Conception of God" the very idea of "God as 
Father* which he found hardest to establish In his f i r s t book. 
GOD1S RELATION TO EVIL • 
Royce says the" True God" i s no"struggling God", but sees a l l 
victory at a moment." Is not a struggling God, needs no man's 
help; uses no means to accomplish his work". Now, a proper 
analysis of the above leads us to quite < different results 
than those reached by our author. He sees i n his Absolute a being 
that needs no agent to help him. Now just what he means by agent 
might be k question.One might assert that vhte means no external 
agent to himself, but he says," no manfs help", and he has said 
that a l l men are In God, therefore he can't mean external to him-
s e l f . Now, according to his theory of good and e v i l and victory, 
e v i l i s an essential to both good and victory. In fact, e v i l i s 
an agwnt,—is "a means" that God uses to produce good. He nays, 
" For now I assert even i n a l l this that the divine f u l f i l l m e n t 
i n Eternity can be won only through the sorrows of time". 
" In the moral man the e v i l w i l l i s an essential element 
of goodness" 466, " The good i s eternally gained even i n and 
through the e v i l " (466) A. This certainly puts a decided l i m i t 
upon his Absolute> who must c a l l to his aid the very agent and the 
only thing that i s to be f i n a l l y overcome, i n order to r e a l i z e 
hi s own eternal f u l f i l l m e n t . 
When Prof. Royce puts e v i l as an essential element of God 
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he leads us into a very hazy doctrine. He asserts that unsat-
i s f i e d desire i s only i n the f i n i t e , not i n the i n c l u s i v e 
I n f i n i t e . (444A) But on page (442 A) a l l things are included 
i n God, then i t would appear that, unsatisfied desire, must 
be i n the possession of the included.But unsatisfied desire i s 
not necessarily an absolute e v i l . Of the l a t t e r , our author 
takes the position i n his e a r l i e r writings that i t i s eternal, 
abiding forever, a part of the Absolute." For i n him-the moral 
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man-the e v i l w i l l i s an essential element of his goodness. The 
c o n f l i c t s of morality are and must be eternal* (466 Asp.) 
" No genuine moral goodness i s possible save i n the 
midst of such inner warfare. The absence of e v i l impulse 
leaves naught but innocence or i n s t i n c t , morally i n s i p i d and 
colorless",-—God fs l i f e i s this I n f i n i t e rest, not apart 
from but i n the endless s t r i f e . This idea of God and I 
.struggling together to overcome the sorrows of time i s carried 
a l l through his two volumes of * World & Individual" but at 
the close of Lecture 9 second series, he sees the" assurance 
of the divine triumph i n Eternity l i g h t i n g up the Whole". But, 
nowhere i n Time i s perfection to be founds" But God sees f u l -
f i l l m e n t from the beginning; God sees f i n a l triumph. Then 
f i n a l triumph must come or God 3ees wrong. 
" Ah, then, to be sure, there w i l l come somewhere my 
l a s t temporal moment". " I f I am to be perfected i n my own 
kind--as I must be, so sure as God is,-then there seemingly 
l i e s ahead of ,me the temporal f u l f i l l m e n t of my l i f e , the l a s t 
moment of my process toward my perfection. Now, remember, the 
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only process toward p e r f e c t i o n i s i n overcoming e v i l . And now 
we have come to the l a s t moment. What of the next moment 
fo l l o w i n g t h i s l a s t moment of tirae-sin-struggling a c t i v i t y ? 
11 Now I am f u l f i l l e d * 1 : but Professor Royce believes 
i h Immortality. The i n d i v i d u a l l i v e s on, but i n what condition, 
and why: our author doesn't know, but a pos i t i v e explanation 
i s not necessary. He i s not struggling with e v i l . E v i l Is 
conquered: i f thi s i s not true, then a l l quests are not 
found; the vi c t o r y i s not complete. But t h i s i s impossible. 
God knows complete v i c t o r y from the beginning and the i n d i v -
i d u a l knows i t now. And, so e v i l i s not eternal. Again, we 
see our author abandoning his e a r l i e r p o s i t i o n . His f i r s t 
conception of r e a l goodness i s that of eternal b a t t l e , but 
l a t e r he sees the fruitlessneqs of an in d i v i d u a l t r y i n g to do 
what he may never do, and f i n a l l y allows him- to overcome. 
TRUTH and VALIDITY 1 
Upon the question of truth, Prof. Royce seems to have 
made quite an evolution. In his e a r l i e r books, i f he had a 
c l e a r cut idea of truth and error, i t i s c e r t a i n l y not c l e a r l y 
expressed. As near as we can come to h i s thought, truth i s 
somewhere lodged between the mind of man and that of God, but 
h i s idea of the ind i v i d u a l i s also hazy., and perhaps the d l s ~ 
lodgement of the truth w i l l come with the releasing of the 
i n d i v i d u a l from the grasp of the a l l absorbing Absolute. 
And t h i s very idea runs through nearly a l l the points that 
w i l l be discussed i n t h i s paper. The idea of an absorbing 
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Absolute takes from the human ind i v i d u a l h i s power to know 
truth, his freedom of choice, his i n d i v i d u a l i t y , and h i s 
immortality. The expected happens, for when our author 
l i b e r a t e s the individual he takes him with hi*? idea to the 
object and l o t s him f i n d out by t r i a l whether i t answers to h i s 
purpose. We pass to h i s teachings regarding r e a l i t y . "External 
re&li&y was to be postulated, not given; existence for us 
because we willed i t to be. To a portion of our conscious 
states we ascribed a v a l i d i t y beyond the present*. Such an 
external r e a l i t y was always conceived as more or l e s s complete-
l y the counterpart of our idea of i t , and hence, as i n nature, 
l i k e the facts of our consciousness, 1 1 n But the external re-
a l i t y was also conceived,as being r e a l for consciousness and r e a l 
only for consciousness. The external r e a l i t y , being an organic 
whole, must therefore be conceived as the object of an Absolute 
experience, to which a l l facts are known, and fbK which a l l 
f a c t s are subject to universal law." (Asp. 369.) 
But his meaning i s here quite obscure, r e a l i t y i s only 
for consciousness and our fellow man are conscious beings, 
therefore, r e a l i t y i s for men, but he explains that the agree-
mnnt or the disagreement of h i s judgment with their intended 
object exists and has meaning for an actual thoiaght, a conscious 
ness, to which both these reMted terras are present, namely, 
both the judgment and the object wherewith i t i s to agree• 
So that, i f my thought has objects outside of i t with which 
i t can agree or disagree, those objects and that agreement can 
have meaning, can be possible only i f there i s a thought that 
includes both my thought and the object wherewith my thought i s 
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to agree". 
Thus r e a l i t y has meaning only when the idea formed i n 
the mind about an object and the object are both included, 
and are a part of a higher thought. We have thus r e a l l y answered 
the question of truth: but a further investigation might throw 
additional l i g h t on this much discussed point." 
"Judgments are true or fals e only i n reference to a 
higher inclusive thought, which they presuppose, and which 
must, i n the l a s t analysis, be assumed as I n f i n i t e and a l l 
i n c l u s i v e " . (393 Asp.) " So that every error implies a 
thought that includes i t and the corresponding truth i n the 
unity of one thought with the object of both of them. Only 
as present to an including thought are they either true or 
f a l s e . " " What then, i s an error? I t i s an incomplete 
thought, that, to a higher thought, which includes i t and 
i t s intended object, i s known as having f a i l e d i n the purpose 
that i t more or less c l e a r l y had, and that i s f u l l y r e a l i s e d i n 
t h i s higher thought, and without such higher Inclusive thought, 
an assertion has no external object, and i s no error 1 1. 
(Asp. 425) " A truth, then, i s a complete thought, which i s 
opposed to an error. Only as actually included i n a higher 
thought that gives to the f i r s t i t s completed object, and 
compares i t therewith, i s the f i r s t thought an error". "But, 
the higher thought must include the opposed truth, tor which 
the error i s compared i n that higher thought. The higher thought 
i s the whole truth, of which the error i s by i t s e l f an incom-
plete fragment." " You cannot make a truth or a falsehood 
21 
by your thought* You only f i n d one." (Asp.431) • Sara f o r 
thought, there i s no truth, no error. Save for inclusive 
thought, there i s no truth, no error, i n separate thought. 
Separate thoughts, as such, cannot then know or have the d i s -
t i n c t i o n between their own truth and their own f a l s i t y i n them -
selves, and apart from the inclusive thought. There i s , then, 
hothing of truth or error to be found i n the world of separate 
thoughts as such". (432 Asp) " A l l thoughts, therefore, are 
true or f a l s e , i n the l a s t analysis, only for the a l l - i n c l u d i n g 
Thought, the I n f i n i t e . " Thus, to us, we have a very imprac-
t i c a l idea of truth error and r e a l i t y . There i s neither of the 
three only for the I n f i n i t e . We have f a i l e d to see how the 
f i n i t e , t h i s man, i s to know truth or error,. 
I t wouldn't require much speculative philosophy to prove 
to most men that God, the I n f i n i t e , comprehended a l l truth 
and error. The rea l question i s not yet reached. " How i s th i s 
man to know?" 
A minister sought certain recognitions; he was asked to 
what organization he belonged. He replied, " I get my credentials 
from God". His fr i e n d replied, " That i s good, present them.11 
We see the same d i f f i c u l t y here. God knows truth, to be 
sure, but how i s he to get i t to this individual fragment? 
Now, leaving the e a r l i e r books of our author, we find something 
l i k e t h i s . " Ask me how I discover, i n a concrete case, the 
v a l i d i t y of my idea, how I make i t out for certain that a given 
experience i s possible; and then I answer,1 By actual experience 
alone". 
" When I say then, f A given idea i s certainly v a l i d ; I 
primarily mean merely a given idea i s f u l f i l l e d i n actual 
present experience?. But the range of actual v a l i d i t y i s much 
greater than actual human experience." 
Now comes his clear d i s t i n c t i o n between internal and 
external meanings, the former the idea, the l a t t e r the object. 
He says there can be no judging only with reference to 
external objects. " To judge i s to judge about the Real*, 
i t i s to consider internal meanings with, reference to external 
meanings. ( W. of I . 1-273 ) " We have ourinternal meanings. 
We develop them i n inner experience. There they get presented 
as something of universal value, but always i n fragments, They 
d i s s a t i s f y . We conceive the Other wherein these meanings 
s h a l l get some sort of f i n a l f u l f i l l m e n t . " 
" We view our ideas an shadows or imitations of this 
Other". 
" This experience by which we compare the idea with the 
Other, i s lighted up by ideas, i s carefully selected.(285, 
W. of r * Vol.1) . But the real test of the correspondence of the 
idea and the object i s Purpose.(506,W. of I . Vol. 1) 
I f the object possesses the real correspondence that the idea 
wanted i t to possess i t i s truth; otherwise i t i s not truth." 
There seems to be l i t t l e place here f o r the " higher thought" 
but i t i s manifestly more mundane. While i t matters but l i t t l e 
which takes the i n i t i a t i v e the idea or object i n a given judgment 
our author puts stress on the former. This doctrine of truth 
i s thus developed from the Milky-way of "higher thought" 
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wherein t r u t h and "error i s only f o r the I n f i n i t e , i n t o the 
c l e a r cut i d e a t h a t a t r u t h i s such when the o b j e c t f u l f i l l s 
the purpose of the i d e a , and we know t h i s agreement by 
a c t u a l e m p i r i c a l methods. 
I t i s remarkable how a l l of the ideas of Prof.Royce 
have a t r e n d away from the dreamland of youth toward'the 
wide awake r e a l i t i e s of a c t u a l l i f e . 
INDIVIDUALITY. 
There seemed to be no place i n the e a r l i e r w r i t i n g s 
of Royce f o r the i n d i v i d u a l . In f a c t , the place of the i n d i -
v i d u a l was so f i l l e d up w i t h h i s Absolute that he r e a l l y 
disappeared. We do not d e s i r e to be u n f a i r , so w i l l quote 
f r e e l y from the Book,"Aspects of Philosophy". <?We p r a c t i c a l l y 
experience the t r u t h t h a t a p e r f e c t l y f a i r judge of us a l l 
would not be s a t i s f i e d merely w i t h orw i n d i v i d u a l content-
merits as-such, but would a l s o demand the d e s t r u c t i o n 
of a l l our i n d i v i d u a l l i m i t a t i o n s " . M But such a l i f e ?;ould 
be no l o n g e r a l i f e of separate i n d i v i d u a l s , each l i m i t e d 
to h i s p e t t y sphere of work. I t would be a l i f e i n which 
s e l f was l o s t i n a h i g h e r u n i t y of a l l the conscious s e l v e s " . 
(A200) " Thou and I , neighbor, have no r i g h t s i n t h i s w o r l d 
as i n d i v i d u a l s . We are instruments." (215.) 
" Wo one who wanders i n t o the f o l d of I d e a l i s m may 
expect to f i n d i t ordered f o r h i s i n d i v i d u a l good. 
* The I n f i n i t e was not e l e c t e d by h i s v o t e " . 
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" I f the moral i n s i g h t wants r e l i g i o u s support, p o s s i b l y 
the f a i l u r e of a l l these personal concerns of ours to f i n d 
any h i n t of response from the Absolute, may not render im-
p o s s i b l e the e t h i c a l undertakings of the human S p i r i t . " 
(438) Here we f i n d no h i n t of response from the Absolute 
coming because of our personal concerns. tf The world of l i f e 
i s , then, what we d e s i r e d i t to be, an organic t o t a l . And 
the i n d i v i d u a l selves are drops i n the ocean of the Absolute 
t r u t h . " Drops:- swallowed up i n t o the whole, no I n d i v i d u a l i t y 
no i d e n t i t y . " Whereas we formerly said,devote t h y s e l f 
to A r t , to science, to the State, v/e now say," Devote your-
se l v e s to l o s i n g your l i v e s i n the Divine l i f e . " (442) 
Thus the young and e n t h u s i a s t i c Royce exhorted men to 
cease t h e i r endeavors i n the ordinary p u r s u i t s of l i f e , and 
t u r n t h e i r powers toward being l o s t i n God, whatever that 
might have meant to him. Just how long a sleep t h i s may have 
meant i t i s impossible to say. C e r t a i n i t i s i f that l o s i n g 
process was not too complete the elder Royce probably reached 
them w i t h h i s more matured v o i c e , f o r he c a l l s out to the 
same people," Thou a r t i n God, but thou a r t not l o s t i n him"< 
( W of I . Book I P 465.) 
There i s c e r t a i n l y q.uite an e v o l u t i o n here, or language i s 
capable of l i t t l e accuracy. " And h e r e i n we have comfort. 
We p e r i s h but thou endurest. Ours i s not thy e t e r n i t y . L i k e 
h e a l t h y leaves that f l o u r i s h e d f o r a time but have f a l l e n " . 
The s i m i l e i s c e r t a i n l y good, l i k e leaves once a l i v e but now 
f a l l e n and trodden under f o o t . This i s comfort, and here 
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I n d i v i d u a l i t y and i m m o r t a l i t y blend. "Does i t help you to 
know,-not of a goodly place where you p e r s o n a l l y and.indiv-
i d u a l l y s h a l l l i v e ? The r e l i g i o u s comfort that a man gets 
from contemplating a l l t h i s i s very d i f f e r e n t from the 
c o n s o l a t i o n of the separate i n d i v i d u a l " . ( 4 4 7 . ) 
" But of a personal judge who respects not a whit 
your person". 447. " Then i t i s not your triumph that you 
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seek, but the triumph of the highest. (447) 
ff In God thy separateness i s destroyed, and with, i t 
thy s i n as e v i l " . Not much l e f t here f o r e t h i c s to f a s t e n 
to . The i n d i v i d u a l w i t h h i s s i n destroyed. Wherein comes 
personal e f f o r t ? 
Thus does the e a r l y Roycean philosophy l o s e the i n -
d i v i d u a l i n the Absolute. And to him there apparently comes 
great peace and joy because of the complete triumph of the 
E t e r n a l . Oh, i t i s but the peace of being nothing, t ! i s the 
s l e e p of ancient I n d i a , i t i s the merging i n t o Buddha* This 
i s s u r e l y the sleep c a l l e d Nirvana. But the philosophy of 
Royce has not reached t h i s N i r v a n i c s l e e p ; i t l i v e s and grows. 
x n a l a t e r work (W o f f . preface I 15) he says: 
fr I was not c l e a r as to how the general d o c t r i n e ought to 
apply as to the i n d i v i d u a l " . But the problem of the i n d i v -
i d u a l as I have since more c l e a r l y seen, i s thft c e n t r a l 
and important one i n the I d e a l i s t i c theory of being." 
"'Moreover, Socrates, even as an i n d i v i d u a l , has a two 
f o l d b eing i n God as an i n d i v i d u a l idea e t e r n a l l y present." 
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— P l a t o ' s e t e r n a l forms--" And out of God as created being 
" (apparent Theism) ( C of G. 283) Again, w Be unique 
even as your Father i n Heaven i s unique, be l o y a l to the 
unique". (0 of G. 268) 
In h i s chapter on Immortality, he says," You want to 
know t h a t somewhere h e — t h i s i n d i v i d u a l , he h i m s e l f , and 
not another—knows h i m s e l f , as.' :fulf i l l e d " . Your i n d i v i d u a l 
g o a l — i s by y o u r s e l f - y o u y o u r s e l f and not another". (C of Off 
3256) 
Besides the references here quoted, much of h i s l a t e r 
energies have been spent i n p r o v i d i n g a piace f o r the i n d i v i d u a l 
i n h i s philosophy. I t was upon t h i s p o i n t that Prof. Howison, 
of the U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , c r i t i c i s e d him so s h a r p l y ; but 
Y/hether he e s t a b l i s h e d a place i n h i s philosophy or not makes 
no d i f f e r e n c e to us. The f a c t that he t r i e s to do so, shows 
an e v o l u t i o n from h i s e a r l i e r works wherein no such e f f o r t was 
made. 
There seems to be more of a new c r e a t i o n here to us 
r a t h e r than a development . i n h i s e a r l i e r w r i t i n g s he purposely 
merges the i n d i v i d u a l i n t o the Absolute, w i t h no reference 
to :the d e s i r e of the i n d i v i d u a l : w i t h no thought as to the 
quest or d e s i r e of the personal Ego. But i n h i s l a t e r works, 
he l a b o r s hard to develop the d o c t r i n e of i n d i v i d u a l i t y . 
Thus the i n d i v i d u a l , b l i n d e d and blended by and w i t h 
the Absolute, a r i s e s from a f i r e - m i s t of i n t a n g i b l e forms, and 
walks out i n t o the Brummond l i g h t of separate i n d i v i d u a l i t y . 
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FREEDOM. 
A lengthy d i s c u s s i o n on the subject of Freedom would 
be but a r e p e t i t i o n of what has been s a i d i n other parts of 
t h i s paper: immortality, I n d i v i d u a l i t y , and Freedom are each 
and a l l depending upon the conception of God. 
I f the Absolute a c t u a l l y absorbs the i n d i v i d u a l there 
i s . c l e a r l y no place f o r separate immortality or freedom. 
This i s the a t t i t u d e that our author assumes i n h i s e a r l y 
philosophy. On the question of freedom he comes as near be-
ing v i n c o n s i s t e n t as on any one he discusses. Before he 
gets i n t o h i s pure philosophy, he grants to the i n d i v i d u a l 
the p r i v i l e g e of personal choice. He allows him to r e j e c t the 
Moral I n s i g h t ; as we have already quoted, I n h i s chapter on 
tf R e l i g i o u s I n s i g h t " he reaches complete a b s t r a c t i o n and 
los e s the i n d i v i d u a l with h i s freedom completely i n the 
I n f i n i t e ; whatever the i n d i v i d u a l chooses, he chooses God fs 
plan f o r him; i f he choose e v i l , that was God's idea; but 
e v i l w i l l must be overcome by a sort of over balancing of 
good w i l l s . 
When we get to "Conception of God" we f i n d that the 
i n d i v i d u a l may f r e e l y choose h i s destiny i n l i f e ; i n f a c t , 
immortal l i f e c o n s i s t s of possessing the goal of l i f e - f r e e l y 
chosen i n a temporary l i f e . This doctrine then, a r i s e s from 
a conglomerate mass and grows i n t o 8 the man who f r e e l y 
chooses h i s own destiny i n l i f e H J but the l a t t e r p o s i t i o n i s 
but a r e v e r t i o n to the f i r s t , expressed i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of 
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the " Moral I n s i g h t " and so I have chosen to see a small 
amount of, not pure e v o l u t i o n , but inconsistency. 
IMMORTALITY. 
The l a s t question to be examined i s Immortality. The 
younger man had no place i n h i s philosophy f o r i t , i n f a c t , 
h i s d o c t r i n e stops short of anything p e r t a i n i n g to the f u t -
ure. He asserts that as a c h i l d he had no f a i t h i n such a 
sp e c u l a t i v e idea. To quote, " Y/e know nothing about i n d i v -
i d u a l immortality, nothing of any endless future progress 
of our species, a l l that i s dark." Then he sees no place 
where we ma y . i n d i v i d u a l l y dwell as a reward f o r -a good l i f e . 
But t h i s i s not p o s i t i v e . Here are some statements that 
have no u n c e r t a i n sounds. " We p e r i s h , but thou endurest, Ours 
i s not thy E t e r n i t y " . ( Asp. 440) " I t i s not your triumph 
but that of &od." Then he sees not one of the a s p i r a t i o n s of 
the human heart s a t i s f i e d . And what a climax to a book that 
had as one of i t s avowed objects the discovery of a power or 
person that s h a l l help us i n our poor e f f o r t s to do ri]ght. 
He scours the world of philosophy, and being f r e e from a#y 
previous b i a s , he speculates about Ibhe Absolute,, about t r u t h , 
about mental powers, about theology, i n f a c t , most of human 
i n t e r e s t s are examined, and he f i n d s much that cheers him-. 
As a f i n a l windujb he discovers a l i t t l e g i r l who had great love 
and respect f o r her k i n g . A wedding f e a s t i s i n progress at 
the palace and the l i t t l e g i r l would b r i n g him a wedding 
present: a bouquet of w i l d flowers Is a l l she has to o f f e r . She 
waits a long time outside the palace gate amid the j o s t l i n g 
t h r o n g and f i n a l l y s i n k s down besi d e the gate, weary and t i r e d 
and d i s a p p o i n t e d . She SODS h e r s e l f to s l e e p , and the n i g h t 
wind s c a t t e r s the lea v e s of her now withered f l o w e r s i n t o 
the s t r e e t s to be trampled i n t o the mud by the ki n g ' s horses 
and c a r r i a g e s . " Yet a l l t h a t happens only because ther e are 
i n f i n i t e l y f a i r e r t r e a s u r e s w i t h i n the palace than the i g n o -
r a n t c h i l d c o u l d b r i n g . The K i n g knows of t h i s , yes, and of 
t e n thousand o t h e r p r o f f e r e d g i f t s of l o y a l s u b j e c t s . But he 
needs them n o t . " (Asp.483) 
What c o n s o l a t i o n ? Neighbor, why dost thou t o i l and 
s t r u g g l e and work? Others' are not s t r i v i n g to l i v e a r i g h t 
l i f e ; they are not g a t h e r i n g w i l d f l o w e r s f o r the k i n g , why 
needest thou? Thou w i l t o n l y f a l l underneath the pala c e 
window, weary and s i c k , and h e l p l e s s «and hope l e s s , and-dead. 
The n i g h t winds w i l l s c a t t e r thy f l o w e r s and a l l because i n 
thy ignorance thou d i d s t not know t h a t some one e l s e had 
brought c o s t i l i e r g i f t s than thou c o u l d s t b r i n g . Or, perhaps, 
thou d i d s t gather the f l o w e r s i n the k i n g " s f o r e s t . 
What a p i t y t h a t l i t t l e f l o w e r g i r l can't accompany 
the w r i t e r hereof as he c l o s e s , " Aspects of Philosophy' 1 f o r 
the l a s t time, w i t h i t s dead l e a v e s , and gloomy darkness, and 
hopeless h e r o i c s e l f s a c r i f i c e , and opens "Conception of Sod" 
wherein the author has caught a h i g h e r conception of hmman l i f e . 
But l e t us t r a c e t h i s e v o l u t i o n l o g i c a l l y . The ver y 
pages of t h i s l a s t book seem to grow i n p e r c e p t i o n as our 
author proceeds. 
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I t required a great force of w i l l power to rescue 
t h i s nan from the grasp of the absolute, and what Royce had 
chosen to c a l l *• white-robed-sabbath school ennui" prejudice. 
Prof. Royce, i n h i s f i n a l immortality idea, runs up 
against the very d i f f i c u l t y he previously found i n the older 
theology, v i z : a place of v i c t o r y where there may be nothing 
to do. In h i s e f f o r t s to avoid such a winding up he declined 
to wind up at a l l i n h i s f i r s t book. In h i s other books, he 
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"boldly attacks the o l d enemy and evidently discovers that 
i t was only a chained l i o n . His idea of God i s that he i s no 
" s t r u g g l i n g God" but that he i s ever and always v i c t o r i o u s . 
Of the i n d i v i d u a l he says:-" For i n t h i s l i f e the f i n i t e 
ego i s only a seeker of i t s goal, as a Knight of h i s quest, 
yet, by our foregoing hypothesis, the'goal of the ego, i t s 
l i f e - i d e a l , i s one of God's i d e a l s , actual, or genuine"•(C ofG. 
322-3) 
But the reaching of this' goal does not occur i n t h i s 
l i f e . He says-" I t does not occur i n our e a r t h l y experience." 
C. of G# 324) 
" The i n d i v i d u a l ' s l i f e i s a process of experience that 
means the aim of a t t a i n i n g h i s l i f e - i d e a l " . " I f t h i s aim i s 
one of God's aims-as i t i s - t h i s aim does not remain, from an 
absolute point of view, a barely possible i d e a l " . (C.ofG.323) 
11 In God a l l i s P e r f e c t i o n . ' (Asp. 443) 
" And f o r God there are no genuine p o s s i b i l i t i e s u n f u l -
f i l l e d ; no true ideas that have above r e a l i t y as bare p o s s i -
b i l i t i e s . " (C of G. 323) 
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I t f o l l o w s that n This attainment of the i d e a l of one's 
l i f e i s a concrete, a conscious attainment". " I cannot a t t a i n 
i t i n t h i s l i f e , I must then have another l i f e - b u t what l i f e ? 
An endless one." 
Now the former idea of our author was that there was no 
goodness only as i t came from overcoming the e v i l • w i l l - e v i l 
i s eternal-but from the above quotation i t appears that there 
i s a goal to be reached and that not i n t h i s l i f e . I f t h i s 
thought-good i s attained through c o n f l i c t with evil-be true, 
immortality i s the pri c e of an endless s t r i f e , because i f 
the goal i s reached, s t r i f e must cease, f o r a cessation of 
s t r i f e i s the goal of most men. Now i f the s t r i f e has ceased 
goodness has ceased also, and l i f e without goodness moans a 
genuine "old-fashioned h e l l " . 
But our "Idealts are God's ideals-and God has no u n f u l f i l l e d 
ideas, therefore, f f a l l quests are f u l f i l l e d : the goal-yes, 
your i n d i v i d u a l goal i s by you attained i n the eternal l i f e " . 
C of G. 326) 
But t h i s i s the f a i t h of our philosopher set on f i r e of 
human hope. And now comes the c o n f l i c t of philosophy and f a i t h . 
" I f I am to be perfected i n my own kind-as I must be, so 
surely as God l i v e s - t h e n there seemingly l i e s ahead of me the 
temporal f u l f i l l m e n t of my l i f e , the l a s t moment of my process 
toward my p e r f e c t i o n , ̂ n the other hand, i f there i s ahead of 
me such a l a s t moment, i t must be a l a s t moment, not of a nature-
process, but of a moral ego. But a temporal moral ego that s t i l l 
says: " Now I am f u l f i l l e d ; there i s no more beyond; time ends 
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f o r mef- i t seems a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n terms". 
u u r author has thus l e d the i n d i v i d u a l through earth's 
c o n f l i c t s and probably a dozen other temporal l i v e s , and f i -
n a l l y brought him to h i s l a s t moment before h i s p e r f e c t i o n 
and g o a l , which, i f God l i v e s , must be, and now he h e s i t a t e s 
what to do w i t h him next; no wonder i t seems a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . 
" Choose ye t h i s day whom ye s h a l l serve", was a demand 
Of an.older prophet. L i k e those people, Royce must choose one 
of the horns of the dilemma. He must merge the i n d i v i d u a l 
i n t o h i s Absolute, which he d i d as a young man, or he may 
t r a n s f e r him i n t o a f i n a l heaven of v i c t o r y , which l a t t e r 
Idea has been so repugnant to him up to t h i s point. He has 
given up the idea of keeping him h e r o i c a l l y f i g h t i n g on f o r -
ever, because h i s Absolute i n that case would f a i l to see the 
v i c t o r y , and he has seen that from the beginning. He d e l i b e r -
a t e l y chooses the f i n a l v i c t o r y idea with a l l i t s ennui and 
i n s i p i d i t y * He no?/ d i s c o v e r s what he could not perceive f o r 
the o l d e r f a i t h , v i z : That many "of the things s a i d about the 
future of men were u t t e r e d i n symbol.(0 of G 325) 
ff Eye hath not seen no>* ear heard, nor does language 
convey to us the r e a l i t i e s that s h a l l be". At t h i s point he 
abandons a l l bases of supplies and steps b o l d l y f o r t h from a l l 
e a r l i e r p o s i t i o n s and exclaims:-" You want to know that some 
where h e - t h i s i n d i v i d u a l , he himself and not another-knows 
h i m s e l f as f u l f i l l e d a f t e r h i s own k i n d ; as possesses of a l i f e 
t h a t , i n i t s wholeness, e a r t h l y and superhuman, i s adequate 
to h i s i d e a l . That t h i s i s the case i s ju s t what t r a d i t i o n 
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Has a s s e r t e d i n i t s doctrine of the f i n a l p e r f e c t i o n of the 
ju s t and of the unjust, each a f t e r i t s own f r e e l y chosen kind. 
Philosophy here supports t r a d i t i o n . — a l l quests ire f u l f i l l e d 
the goal-yes, your i n d i v i d u a l g o a l - i s by you yourself a t t a i n e d 
in'.the e t e r n a l l i f e . " (C of G 526) No merging into the abso-
l u t e here; no e t e r n i t y of e v i l , but a triumph over i t . No 
quests to be sought; yes, the i n d i v i d u a l has triumphed over 
a l l . A l l has been reached a f t e r that l a s t moment of s t r i f e 
and the i n d i v i d u a l of a thousand b a t t l e f i e l d s , has reached 
the place supported a l i k e by philosophy and theology. This 
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s u r e l y i s not the place r e f e r r e d to i n Prof. James' "Dilemma 
of D e t e r m i n i s m , w h i c h our author quoted with delight as a 
young man. That was a place of rtwhite-robed-harp-playing-
heaven of our Sabbath schools. The vacuous and expressionless, 
and unexampled i n s i p i d i t y , and i n o f f e n s i v e l i v e s - b e t t e r lose 
than win and be saved from so s i n g u l a r l y f l a t a winding up". 
With t h i s f a i t h s t r e t c h and the exhaustion of earth's cate-
gories to e x p l a i n the beyond, our author sees the agreement 
of o l d things with the new, and i s probably w i l l i n g to leave 
the r e l i g i o n of childhood w i t h them/ Y/e have not seen, or 
heard, nor dreamed what G o d hath i n st o r e * " n But how and when 
we cannot know upon t h i s shoal of time". 
As we c l o s e , we see a doctrine that has grown from 
neglect-yes, from r e a l opposition-from darkness i n t o a c l e a r 
cut idea of r e a l , personal immortality. From dead leaves 
under the tree to the leaves of the t r a d i t i o n a l tree of l i f e j 
from unappreciated w i l d flowers to the flowers that forever 
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bloom. L i t t l e f l o w e r g i r l , a r i s e : i f t h a t bunch of w i l d 
f l o w e r s i s thy go a l up to thy time of l i f e , the k i n g r a i l 
open the pala c e gate sometime, somewhere, and b i d thee 
f r e e l y come i n . To the c h i l d i t w i l l be f l o w e r s and j o y ; t o 
the I n d i a n a h u n t i n g ground; we can on l y make i t what i s w i t h -
i n our grasp. Why r i d i c u l e the Sunday s c h o o l boy's conception? 
I t i s p r o b a b l y as p e r f e c t as t h i n e . T r a d i t i o n says," I s h a l l 
be s a t i s f i e d " , P h i l o s o p h y , " A l l quests are found." 

